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Abstract—In this paper a new method of establishing secret
keys for wireless communications is proposed. A retrodirective
array (RDA) that is configured to receive and re-transmit at
different frequencies is utilized as a relay node. Specifically the
analogue RDA is able to respond in ‘real-time’, reducing the
required number of time slots for key establishment to two,
compared with at least three in previous relay key generation
schemes. More importantly, in the proposed architecture equiva-
lent reciprocal wireless channels between legitimate keying nodes
can be randomly updated within one channel coherence time
period, leading to greatly increased key generation rates (KGRs)
in slow fading environment. The secrecy performance of this RDA
assisted key generation system is evaluated and it is shown that
it outperforms previous relay key generation systems.
Index Terms—Retrodirective array, key generation, wireless
communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile wireless communication has experienced an un-
precedented growth in recent years presenting many enter-
prise opportunities. Along with these opportunities there are
attendant risks. Wireless communications allow information
flow via broadcasting, which indicates unintended receivers,
namely eavesdroppers, can also receive and decode these in-
formation. Currently sensitive transmission data is encrypted at
the upper protocol layers through mathematical cryptographic
operations [1]. Recently the potential for the efficacy of such
mathematical encryption schemes to be mitigated has been
under discussion [2]. Furthermore, requirements related to
trusted key management infrastructure may render conven-
tional cryptographic method less applicable for some wireless
systems, such as ad-hoc networks and low-cost wireless sensor
networks [3].
Distinct from the upper layer cryptographic approaches,
physical layer security techniques aim to achieve information-
theoretic security. This implies that the achieved level of
security will not be compromised even if an unauthorized third
party has unlimited computational capability [4]. Various types
of physical layer security solutions have been investigated,
including keyless secure transmission [5], directional modu-
lation [6], and key establishment from wireless channels [7].
For wireless key establishment scheme, the secret keys are
generated by exploiting randomness of reciprocal propagation
channels between keying nodes [7]. The information theoret-
ical foundation of this key establishment approach was given
in [8].
There are several characteristics of wireless channels that
can be utilized to extract secret keys, such as received signal
strength (RSS) [9], channel phase delays [10], multipath rela-
tive time delays [11], and full channel state information (CSI)
[12]. These parameters are available in network interface cards
or customized hardware platforms, therefore many practical
key generation systems have been reported [7].
A number of approaches have been proposed to increase key
generation rate (KGR) without degrading key disagreement
rate (KDR). KGR describes the amount of key bits generated
per time unit, and KDR denotes bit disagreement rates of the
generated keys shared by legitimate nodes. In [9], [13] multiple
nodes or multiple antennas at each node are exploited in order
to create multiple usable common channels from which more
key bits can be extracted within one channel coherence time
period. Similarly, multiple independent or quasi-independent
channels can be generated using frequency resources, such
as channel hopping in [14], and OFDM signals in [12]. A
concept ultilizing random beamforming was proposed in [14],
[15]. Here the excitation weights of multi-antenna nodes are
randomly updated during each key generation round, such that
a controlled artificial ‘fast fading’ channel is created. As a
consequence, more independent random secret key bits can
be generated by repeated channel probing within one channel
coherence time period.
In addition to the above methods, helper or relay nodes
have been introduced in [16]–[18] to further enhance the
key generation performance. Apart from creating more usable
channels, the relay nodes can also help generate artificial noise
[16], [17], which contaminates the intercepted signals received
by eavesdroppers, or helps enhance the randomness of the
channel characteristics [17], [18], in such a fashion to increase
secret key rates.
In this paper we propose a new type of relay key generation
architecture, which uses a retrodirective array (RDA) [19]
as a relay node. This arrangement has the following unique
characteristics that do not exist in current relay key generation
systems:
a) the RDA relay node can be implemented in an analogue
fashion thereby allowing low power consumption and the
real-time response. The RDA node does not need to have
any additional digital calculation capabilities;
b) since the RDA can operate without demodulating signals
nor estimating channels, the potential for the relay node
to leak information intentionally or unintentionally is sig-
nificantly reduced, i.e., it can be considered as a trusted
node;
c) no system parameters including CSI, training sequences,
and time-slot assignment are required by the RDA relay
node;
d) multiple channel measurements can be conducted within
one coherence time period, greatly increasing the achiev-
able KGR. This is because with the help of the RDA the
equivalent channel can be manipulated to be ‘fast fading’;
e) only two time slots are required for each key generation
round, compared with at least three time slots in previous
relay key generation protocols [17].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II system
models including statistical multipath channels and RDAs
used throughout the paper are described. The RDA assisted
key generation architecture and protocol, and eavesdropping
strategies are presented in Section III. In Section IV the
secret key rates of the proposed system are simulated and
compared with previous relay key generation systems. Finally
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used:
Boldface lower case and capital letters, e.g., h and H, denote
parameters in time and frequency domains, respectively, and
they are complex numbers. Boldface capital letter with an
arrow on top, e.g., ~H, refers to a vector, whose elements
are parameters in frequency domain. Letters with superscripts
RDA and r correspond to parameters in the proposed RDA and
previous relay key generation systems. ‘[·]∗’ denotes complex
conjugate operator, and ‘◦’ is the Hadamard product of two
vectors. ‘[x]+’ returns zero if x is less than zero otherwise
returns x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Statistical Multipath Channel Model
In this paper a dynamic multipath-rich Rayleigh wireless
propagation channel is considered. The channel impulse re-
sponse (CIR) can be written as
h(τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)δ(τ − τl), (1)
where h(τl, t) is a complex number representing the attenua-
tion and phase delay of the lth (l = 0, 1, ..., L − 1) propagation
path, i.e., channel taps, between communication nodes at the
time instant t. τl refers to the time delay of the lth channel tap
relative to the corresponding t. δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
It is assumed that, a) at each time instant the total number of
channel taps, i.e., L, is identical, b) τl starts from zero and is
uniformly spaced in time. Thus it can be expressed as τl = lT ,
where T is normally determined by the sampling period of
the hardware, c) the scattering multipath in the channel is
sufficiently rich that the h(τl, t) follows zero-mean complex
Gaussian distribution, i.e., h(τl, t) ∼ CN (0, σ2hl) [20].
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Fig. 1. RDA operating principle.
When taking Fourier transform of (1), the channel frequency
response (CFR) can be obtained, and is given as
H( f , t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl, t)e−j2pi f τl . (2)
Unless otherwise specified, all of the simulation results
presented in this paper are based on the following channel
parameters for a typical wireless indoor environment [21].
• The sampling period T is set to 50 ns;
• The average power of each channel tap follows an expo-
nential decay power delay profile with root mean square
(RMS) delay spread στ of 50 ns, from which the number
of channel taps can be calculated to be 11;
• A bell-shaped Doppler power spectral density with
Doppler spread fd of 10 Hz is used.
B. Retrodirective Arrays (RDAs)
Before describing the RDA relay key generation system
in Section III, RDA operation is briefly presented here. An
RDA has the capability to re-transmit a signal back along the
spatial direction(s), along which the array was illuminated by
the incoming signals without the need for a-priori knowledge
of their points of origin [19]. The core element of an RDA that
enables the tracking functionality is the phase conjugator unit
[22]. Among many forms of phase conjugator units, active ana-
logue types are attractive due to their low power consumption,
real-time response, and frequency reconfiguration flexibility
[23], [24].
The basic operation upon which an RDA is predicated
is illustrated by way of an example shown in Fig. 1. Two
distant sources emit pilot signals s1(t) and s2(t), respectively
at frequency fs . The detected signal in the frequency domain
at the mth (m = 1, 2, ...,M) RDA element can be expressed
as S1( fs)H sm( fs) + S2( fs)Gsm( fs), where the S {1,2} ( fs)
and {H, G}sm( fs) are, respectively, the Fourier representa-
tions of the pilot signal s {1,2} (t) and the propagation channel
{h, g}sm(t) between the sources and the mth RDA antenna
element. After the detected signal is processed through a phase
conjugator, it becomes [S1( fs)H sm( fs)]∗+[S2( fs)Gsm( fs)]∗.
When re-transmitting [S1( fs)H sm( fs)]∗ + [S2( fs)Gsm( fs)]∗
weighted local signal C at frequency fr by the RDA, the
received signal Y 1( fr ) at the source node 1 can be written
as in (3),
Y1( fr ) =
M∑
m=1
C
{
[S1( fs)Hsm( fs)]∗ + [S2( fs)Gsm( fs)]∗
}
Hsm( fr ). (3)
When fr = fs , (4) can, in the absence of noise, be expressed
as
Y1( fs) =
CS∗1( fs)
M∑
m=1
|Hsm( fs) |2 + CS∗2( fs)
M∑
m=1
G∗sm( fs)Hsm( fs).
(4)
Here the channel reciprocity is assumed. For the received
signal Y 2( fr ) at the source node 2 similar expressions can
be obtained, and thus is omitted here.
The first term on the right hand side in (4) represents the
beamforming gain towards the source node 1, while the second
term normally is quite small compared with the first term due
to the fact that Gsm and Hsm are independent.
When fr , fs , as occurs in full-duplex RDAs, the re-
transmission channel {H,G}sm( fr ) , {H,G}sm( fs). In free
space {H,G}sm( fr ) and {H,G}sm( fs) can be directly linked
by compensating their frequency differences [25], thus after
channel coefficient calibration (4) still holds. The scenario of
RDAs in multipath environments when fr , fs , which is
considered in this paper, normally results in reduced beam-
forming gains. The amount of reduction is determined by the
channel parameters, the number of RDA antenna elements, and
the frequency difference between receive and re-transmit. For
the simulation results presented in Section IV, the following
parameters are used: στ = 50 ns, M = 9. The frequency
configuration will be presented in Section IV.
III. RDA ASSISTED WIRELESS KEY GENERATION
In this section RDA assisted key generation system is
presented and the associated adversary model is investigated.
A. RDA Assisted Key Generation
The model of the proposed RDA assisted key generation
system is illustrated in Fig. 2. The nodes Alice and Bob intend
to establish a shared common key with the help of an M-
antenna RDA node. These three nodes are termed legitimate
nodes hereafter. In this paper we assume Alice and Bob are
both equipped with a single antenna. Not discussed in this
paper are multiple-antenna cases which can be investigated
using similar methods to those in [26] for MIMO key gener-
ation scenarios.
Each key generation round only comprises two time slots
(TS1, 2), which are now described;
TS1) Alice and Bob locally generate random and independent
signals Ui and Vi , respectively, and then radiate them at
an identical frequency f1. Here the subscript ‘i’ refers
to the ith key generation round. In order to simplify
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Fig. 2. Proposed RDA assisted wireless key generation system model.
notation, the subscript ‘i’ is omitted later in most
cases. In order to facilitate signal to noise ratio (SNR)
definition later, it is assumed that E[U] = E[V] = 0,
and E
[ |U |2] = E [|V |2] = 1. Alice and Bob do not need
to know or store the values of U and V. The detected
signal vector ~Wb at the RDA can be expressed as
~Wb = q1/21b (~H1U + ~G1V) + ~N1b, (5)
where the mth entry Hmx (Gmx) of the vector ~Hx (~Gx)
represents the channel coefficient between Alice (Bob)
and the mth RDA element at frequency fx (x = 1, 2, 3),
see Fig. 2. ~Nxy (y = a, b) is the frequency represen-
tation of the additive Gaussian white noise (AWGN)
~nxy , whose elements follow CN (0, σ2n), and all are
independent. q1/2xy is a scaling coefficient involving both
the amplification factor at transmitter sides and propa-
gation path loss, and it is used to set required SNR at
receiver sides. Here the 1M
∑M
m=1 E
[ |Hm1U + Gm1V |2 ]
is normalized to be unity. The RDA cannot separate the
two signals transmitted by Alice and Bob because both
signals are at the same frequency, and are occurring at
the same time, and none of Hm1, Gm1, U, and V are
known.
At the same time Alice transmits a publicly known
training sequence X at a different frequency f2 ( f2 ,
f1). The received signal vector at the RDA node at
frequency f2 is q
1/2
2b
~H2X + ~N2b . Here ~H2 is normalized
such that
1
M
M∑
m=1
E
[ |Hm2 |2] = 1, (6)
seen in Fig. 2. Then the ~W
∗
b weighted q
1/2
2b
~H2X+ ~N2b is
radiated by the RDA at frequency f3 ( f3 , f2, f3 , f1).
At the Bob the detected signal Sb at frequency f3 can
be written as
Sb = q1/23b ~G3 ·
[
~W
∗
b ◦
(
q1/22b
~H2X + ~N2b
)]
+ N3b . (7)
Similarly ~G3 is normalized to be
1
M
M∑
m=1
E[|Gm3 |2] = 1. (8)
Since X is publicly known to every node in the
system, Bob is able to obtain the waveform observation
Kb , which in the frequency domain for the purpose of
secret key extraction is shown in (9).
Kb =q1/23b q
1/2
2b
~G3 ·
(
~W
∗
b ◦ ~H2
)
+ q1/23b
~G3 ·
(
~W
∗
b ◦ ~N2b
) /
X + N3b
/
X (9)
TS2) In time slot 2, U and V transmitted by Alice and Bob
at frequency f1 are still present, which generates ~Wa at
the RDA node, seen in (10).
~Wa = q1/21a
(
~H1U + ~G1V
)
+ ~N1a (10)
In this time slot Bob transmits the same known X at
frequency f3, which, after being weighted with ~W
∗
a, is
re-transmitted by the RDA at frequency f2. When the
known X is equalized, the waveform Ka shown in (11)
can be acquired by Alice.
Ka =q1/22a q
1/2
3a
~H2 ·
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~G3
)
+ q1/22a
~H2 ·
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~N3a
) /
X + N2a
/
X (11)
From the first term of the obtained Ka in (11) at Alice
node and the first term of the obtained Kb in (9) at Bob
node, a common secret key can be generated and shared.
It is noted that ~G3 ·
(
~W
∗
{a,b } ◦ ~H2
)
and ~H2 ·
(
~W
∗
{a,b } ◦ ~G3
)
are equivalent. The noise terms, i.e., the last two terms
in both (9) and (11), reduce the correlation coefficients
between Ka and Kb , and hence limit the achievable
secret key rates of the proposed system. These aspects
are investigated in Section IV.
It is worth pointing out that even within one channel coher-
ence time period, i.e., ~H1, ~G1, ~H2, and ~G3 remain unchanged,
the equivalent common channel observation ~H2 ·
(
~W
∗
{a,b } ◦ ~G3
)
still varies, and for different key generation rounds they are
uncorrelated. This is achieved by randomly choosing Ui and
Vi , which are unknown to any of the nodes in the system, in
each key generation round. In other words, many key gener-
ation rounds can be performed within one channel coherence
time period, leading to a greatly increased KGR.
B. Eavesdropping Strategies
In this paper it is assumed that:
• Eve knows the key generation procedures described in
the previous subsection;
• Eve knows the training sequence X;
• No colluding Eves are considered.
Eve can adopt a number of strategies for eavesdropping,
such as directly observing one of the legitimate nodes, and
placing Eve’s antenna close to one of the legitimate nodes.
Among these options, placing Eve’s antenna close to Alice
or Bob is the most effective way in terms of interception,
because the eavesdropping channel between Eve and the RDA
is correlated to the legitimate channel between Alice (or Bob)
and the RDA. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
Eve’s antenna is placed close to Alice in order to facilitate the
following formulation. In this case the eavesdropping channel
vector at frequency f2, denoted as ~P2, seen in Fig. 2, is
correlated to ~H2 through the correlation coefficient ρRDAae
expressed in (12). Here only real part, i.e., Re(·), is considered.
ρRDAae =
1
M
M∑
m=1
E [Re(Pm2)Re(Hm2)]√
E
[(
Re(Pm2)
)2] E [(Re(Hm2))2] (12)
Eve cannot estimate ~P2, and hence ~H2, since
q1/22a q
1/2
3a
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~G3
)
X + q1/22a
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~N3a
)
radiated by the
RDA is unknown to any nodes in the system. Fortunately,
from Eve’s point of view, she does not need to know ~H2.
It is better for her to estimate Ka as a whole directly. The
obtained waveform, Ke, used for estimation can be written as
Ke =q1/22a q
1/2
3a
~P2 ·
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~G3
)
+ q1/22a
~P2 ·
(
~W
∗
a ◦ ~N3a
) /
X + N2e
/
X, (13)
where channel noise N2e at the Eve node is assumed to have
the same distribution as N2a.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section the secrecy performance, i.e., secret key
rates expressed in (14), [8], of the proposed RDA assisted
key generation system is evaluated, and compared with those
in previous relay systems. The previous relay key generation
systems used for comparison are schemes described in [17].
For system simulation results presented in this section, the
knn distance method [27] is adopted for mutual information
estimation.
RRDAs =
[
I
(
Re (Ka) ; Re (Kb)
)
−
min
(
I
(
Re (Ka) ; Re (Ke)
)
, I
(
Re (Kb) ; Re (Ke)
))]+
(14)
The calculated secret key rates RRDAs in the proposed RDA
assisted key generation systems are shown in Fig. 3. In the
simulation it is assumed that the RDA is equipped with 9
antenna elements, and the ∆ f = f3 − f2 = f2 − f1 is chosen
as 2 MHz. The magnitudes of U and V are set to be unity
with their phase uniformly distributed within the range of 0 to
2pi. The SNRs in all transmission links in the key generation
process are assumed to be identical, i.e.,
SNRRDA = q1a/σ2n = q3a/σ
2
n = q1aq2aq3a/σ
2
n. (15)
In [17] four relay key generation schemes were pre-
sented, which are classified by the authors as amplify-and-
forward (AF), signal-combining amplify-and-forward (SC-
AF), multiple-access amplify-and-forward (MA-AF), and
amplify-and-forward with artificial noise (AF-AN). The AF
scheme, as the authors pointed out, is not secure when the
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Fig. 3. Calculated secret key rates RRDAs in 9-element RDA assisted key
generation systems as functions of SNRRDA when Eve’s antenna is placed
close to Alice. (στ = 50 ns and ∆ f = 2 MHz)
relay is monitored by Eve. The AF-AN scheme relies on the
design of the artificial noise that is projected by the relay
node towards Eve, but not Alice and Bob. For the architecture
proposed in this paper, the generation of artificial noise using
RDA for the benefit of wireless key generations will be
presented separately in the future. Compared with the SC-AF,
the MA-AF reduces the number of required time slots for a
single key generation round from four to three at the cost of
requirement for synchronization between Alice and Bob. The
secret key rates in the SC-AF and MA-AF systems are almost
identical when the unit ‘bit/channel use’ is adopted. They are
both denoted as Rrs in this paper.
In order to facilitate discussion in this paper, the waveforms
acquired at Alice and Bob used for key generation purpose in
the SC-AF scheme are presented in (16) and (17).
Kra =
1√
2
[
q1/2
r1 (
~H
r
+ ~G
r
) + ~N
r
a2 +
~N
r
b2
]
· ~Hr + Nra3
− *,q1/4r1 ~Hr +
~N
r
a1
q1/4
r1
+- · *,q1/4r1 ~Hr +
~N
r
a1
q1/4
r1
+- (16)
Krb =
1√
2
[
q1/2
r1 (
~H
r
+ ~G
r
) + ~N
r
a2 +
~N
r
b2
]
· ~Gr + Nrb3
− *,q1/4r1 ~Gr +
~N
r
b1
q1/4
r1
+- · *,q1/4r1 ~Gr +
~N
r
b1
q1/4
r1
+- (17)
~H
r
(~G
r
) refers to the Rayleigh wireless channel between Alice
(Bob) and the relay. They are independent, and are normalized
to be
1
M
M∑
m=1
E
[ Hrm2 ] = 1M
M∑
m=1
E
[ Grm2 ] = 1. (18)
It is assumed that all of the noise terms are independent
and follow CN (0, σ2r ). The SNRs of signal transmissions in
each step in the SC-AF key generation process are set to be
identical, denoted as
SNRr = qr1/σ2r . (19)
The secret key rates Rrs in the SC-AF and MA-AF schemes
are defined the same as RRDAs in (14) with K {a,b,e } being
replaced with their counterparts Kr{a,b,e }. Here K
r
e, used for
Rrs calculation in Fig. 4, is the detected waveform by Eve
which is placed close to Alice. In this case, a pair of legitimate
and eavesdropping channels with correlation coefficient ρrae is
created. Clearly, it can be concluded that more noise involved
in the SC-AF (MA-AF) key generation systems, seen in (16)
and (17), reduces the achieved secret key rates Rrs significantly,
when the channel SNRs are identical.
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From Figs. 3 and 4 it can be concluded that the proposed
RDA assisted key generation system outperforms, with regard
to secrecy performance, both the previous SC-AF and MA-AF
relay key generation systems in [17].
Table I summarizes the characteristics of the SC-AF, the
MA-AF, and the proposed RDA assisted wireless key gener-
ation systems. Another advantage of using RDA as a relay
node, which is not discussed before in this paper, is the high
flexibility of adjusting transmission gains from the relay to
Alice (Bob). This can be readily achieved by altering the
ratio between |U |2 and |V |2 at Alice and Bob nodes, which is
proportional to the ratio between power gains towards Alice
and Bob [28].
V. CONCLUSION
A new type of wireless key generation system architecture,
using an RDA as a relay node, was proposed and analyzed
in this paper. By configuring analogue RDAs receive and re-
transmit at different frequencies, the number of time slots
required for each key generation process was reduced to
two. Furthermore, the equivalent reciprocal wireless channels
between legitimate keying nodes can be controlled, by Alice
and Bob, to be ‘fast fading’, which is able to increase KGRs
significantly. Also distinct from the previous relay based key
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SC-AF, MA-AF, AND PROPOSED RDA ASSISTED KEY GENERATION SYSTEMS.
SC-AF MA-AF RDA
Number of required time slots 4 3 2
Nodes requiring knowledge for time slots Alice, Bob, and relay Alice, Bob, and relay Alice and Bob
Strict time synchronization No Yes No
Requirement for calculation capability
in the relay node
Yes Yes No
Rs when Eve’s antenna is placed close
to Alice or Bob
Low
(Fig. 4)
Low
(Fig. 4)
High
(Fig. 3)
Multiple key generation rounds within
one channel coherence time period
No No Yes
generation systems, the RDAs employed do not need to have
additional digital computational capability, and do not need
to acquire knowledge about system parameters, such as time
slots assignment and training sequences, which makes this
architecture more flexible in terms of adding more legitimate
keying nodes and/or more RDA relay nodes. Through sim-
ulations it was shown that the proposed RDA assisted key
generation systems have better secrecy performance than that
in the previous relay key generation systems.
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